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NOTICE AND E ±ARING IN GOVERNMENT
EXCLUSIONARY ACTION
In Homer v. Richmond 1 and Dixon v. Alabama State Bd. of Educ.,2
tvo United States courts of appeals have recently indicated the extent to
which government must afford notice and hearing to persons who have
been excluded from activities in which they have previously been engaged.
In Homer, appellants, who were employed as radio-telegraph operators on
board privately owned vessels of the United States Merchant Marine,
applied to the Commandant of the Coast Guard 3 to secure licenses certify-
ing that they were "suitable and safe" to continue to be entrusted with
the powers and duties of their employment. Their applications were de-
nied 4 on the ground that they were "affiliated with, or sympathetic to the
principles of organizations, associations, groups and combinations of per-
sons subversive or disloyal to the Government of the United States." r On
the basis of a decision in an analogous case,6 appellants renewed their ap-
plications seven years later 7but were again denied certification; thereupon
1292 F.2d 719 (D.C. Cir. 1961).
2294 F.2d 150 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 930 (1961).
3 Appellants made application in compliance with revised regulatory legislation,
62 Stat. 232, 233 (1948), 46 U.S.C. §§ 229a, c (1958), which required radiotelegraph
operators on Merchant Marine vessels to obtain a valid first- or second-class radio-
telegraph operator license from the Federal Communications Commission and then to
apply to the Coast Guard to be designated a licensed officer. 62 Stat. 233 (1948),
46 U.S.C. § 229c (1958), provides: "[I]f, upon full consideration, they are satisfied
that his character, habits of life, and physical condition are such as to authorize the
belief that he is a suitable and safe person to be entrusted with the powers and duties
of such a station, they shall grant him a license . ... "
4The Commandant appointed a board of officers to investigate appellants in
accordance with the statutory standard. The Commandant concurred in the recom-
mendation of the board and denied appellants' applications in 1949. Appellants were
duly notified by letter and informed of their right under 46 C.F.R. § 10.13-17(d) (3)
(1953) to file a written request for reconsideration and of the material which would
be deemed pertinent to such reconsideration. See Brief for Appellee, pp. 2-3.
Sjoint Appendix to Briefs of Appellants and Appellee, p. 104a. The application
of one of the three appellants was denied because he did not possess the necessary
FCC license.
6 Parker v. Lester, 227 F.2d 708 (9th Cir. 1955). This case held invalid pro-
visions of regulations, issued by the President pursuant to the Magnuson Act, 64
Stat. 427 (1950), 50 U.S.C. § 191 (1958), which established a security program author-
izing the deprivation of employment to Merchant Marine seamen without notice or
the opportunity to meet charges against them. Exec. Order No. 10173, 15 Fed. Reg.
7005 (1950), amended by Exec. Order No. 10277, 16 Fed. Reg. 7537 (1951),
amended by Exec. Order No. 10352, 17 Fed. Reg. 4607 (1952).
..7 Appellant Homer made no attempt to secure reconsideration after the initial
denial; in 1952 appellant McCrea made an attempt to receive reconsideration but,
since his affidavit contained no return address, no action was taken upon it; appel-
lant Colcord in 1952 wrote a letter to the Commandant which failed to comply with
the provisions for presentation of pertinent grounds for reconsideration under 46
C.F.R. § 10.13-17(d) (3) (1953).
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they requested hearings which were also refused. In an action seeking
a declaratory judgment that the regulations 8 pursuant to which their ap-
plications had been denied were unconstitutional as applied to appellants,9
the district court, in a memorandum opinion,'0 granted summary judgment
for the defendant Commandant. The Court of Appeals for the District
of Columbia reversed, holding that, although the procedure followed by
the Coast Guard was expressly authorized by Congress,'- the denial of ap-
pellants' applications for licenses without some opportunity to answer
charges was a violation of the fifth amendment due process clause.' 2
In Dixon, students in a state college for Negroes, without prior notice
or hearing, were notified by letter from the college president that they
had been expelled by the Alabama State Board of Education; the ap-
parent '3 basis for expulsion was the students' alleged participation in
various peaceful demonstrations 14 in protest against racial segregation.15
On appeal from denial of injunctive relief against the State Board of
846 C.F.R. § 10.13-17(d) (1) (1953) authorizes the Commandant to reject an
application "when derogatory information has been brought to his attention which
indicates that the applicant's character and habits of life are such as to authorize
the belief that he is not a suitable and safe person to be entrusted with the duties
of radiotelegraph operator on any vessel."
9 While this action was pending in the district court, another board of officers
reviewing appellants' cases concurred in the previous denials and made detailed find-
ings which were adopted by the Commandant and were related with particularity by
letter to each applicant. For the letters of March 27, 1959 from the Commandant
to the three appellants, see Joint Appendix to Briefs of Appellants and Appellee,
pp. lla-14a, 122a-27a, 132a-34a.
10 The district court found that "each plaintiff, although not accorded an oral
hearing, was afforded the opportunity to know and to meet the findings on which
defendant's adverse action was based. Under the circumstances of this case as shown
upon the record . . . there was no denial of due process or violation of constitu-
tional guarantees." Homer v. Richmond, Civil No. 1541-48, D.D.C. March 23, 1960, in
Joint Appendix to Briefs of Appellants and Appellee, pp. 143a-44a.
"1 See note 3 supra.
12 Since the court noted that appellants did not renew their requests for hearings
after the letters of March 27, 1959 from the Commandant, it is possible to view the
court's action as remanding the case to the administrative officer to determine whether
a hearing would be granted upon request of appellants. 30 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 123,
125 n.24 (1961). However, this interpretation seems unnecessarily and unreasonably
narrow in light of the court's determination that the procedures employed by the
government were not consonant with minimum due process requirements. See 292
F.2d at 724.
Ia The court noted that "the misconduct for which the students were expelled
has never been definitely specified. Defendant Trenholm, the President of the Col-
lege, testified that he did not know why the plaintiffs and three additional students
were expelled . . . . The notice of expulsion . . . mailed to each of the plaintiffs
assigned no specific ground for expulsion, but referred in general to 'this problem
of Alabama State College."' 294 F.2d at 151-52. The grounds mentioned in the
text were stated in the testimony of Governor Patterson. Id. at 153. They seem to
constitute the most reasonable explanation for the Board's action.
14The court accepted the finding of the district court, Dixon v. Alabama State
Bd. of Educ., 186 F. Supp. 945, 947 (M.D. Ala. 1960), that all six appellants were
present at a sit-in in the publicly owned lunch room in the basement of the county
courthouse in Montgomery, Alabama, but that the evidence did "not affirmatively
show that all of the plaintiffs were present at any but . . . [that] one demon-
stration." 294 F.2d at 152-53.
15 See generally Pollitt, Dime Store Demonstrations: Events and Legal Problems
of First Sixty Days, 1960 DUKE L.J. 315.
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Education and the college president,16 the Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit, one judge dissenting,1 7 reversed, holding that due process required
a state to afford notice and hearing before a student at a public college
could be expelled for such misconduct.18
I. GOVERNMENT EXCLUSIONARY ACTION
Procedural due process cases 19 relevant to Homer and Dixon have
usually been discussed in three categories-public employment discharge
16 Dixon v. Alabama State Bd. of Educ., 186 F. Supp. 945 (M.D. Ala. 1960).
Appellants sought a preliminary and permanent injunction to restrain the State Board
of Education and the college president from obstructing their right to attend Alabama
State College.
17The dissenting opinion adopted the reasoning of the district court that since
a student had no right to attend a state college, except as conditioned by his com-
pliance with its scholastic and disciplinary requirements, the proper college authorities,
in the interests of preserving ideals of scholarship or moral atmosphere, might formu-
late reasonable rules and regulations in the exercise of a broad discretion, with which
courts should not interfere unless it were abused. 294 F.Zd at 160-61.
' 8 Accord, Knight v. State Bd. of Educ., 200 F. Supp. 174 (M.D. Tenn. 1961),
a recent case which followed the Dixon holding in determining that student freedom
riders convicted of disorderly conduct in Mississippi could not be automatically
expelled from their Tennessee state college without fair hearing to consider whether
their convictions were ones "involving personal misconduct"-the standard established
by the Tennessee State Board of Education-or merely a technical violation.
19 No case has squarely raised the issue of whether fifth and fourteenth amend-
ment due process would require equal safeguards under the same circumstances,
particularly in the more narrow area of due process in discharge, licensing, or security
clearance cases. But cases dealing with the fifth and fourteenth amendments have
cited both state and federal cases without recognition of any potential difference
between them. For example, Greene v. McElroy, 360 U.S. 474, 492 (1959) (a fifth
amendment case), cited Dent v. West Virginia, 129 U.S. 114 (1889), and Schware
v. Board of Bar Examiners, 353 U.S. 232 (1957) (both fourteenth amendment
cases), to substantiate the theory that the right to hold specific private employment
is protected by the due process clause of the fifth amendment. Wieman v. Updegraff,
344 U.S. 183, 191-92 (1952) (a fourteenth amendment case), cited United Pub.
Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75, 100 (1947) (a fifth amendment case), to demon-
strate that a court only begs the question in saying that there is no constitutionally
protected right to public employment. Again, three Supreme Court Justices appear
to have indicated that they consider there is no difference between the procedural
protection required by the fifth and fourteenth amendment due process clauses. In
Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 66 (1947) (concurring opinion), Mr. Justice
Frankfurter stated: "It ought not to require argument to reject the notion that due
process of law meant one thing in the Fifth Amendment and another in the Four-
teenth." Moreover, although this statement was made in rejecting the suggestion
that the fourteenth amendment due process clause incorporated the first eight amend-
ments, and thus may not be a clear indication of Mr. Justice Frankfurter's views,
the same Justice's concurring opinion in Hannah v. Larche, 363 U.S. 420, 491 (1960),
uses fourteenth amendment cases to "strongly support" the fifth amendment decision.
In another concurring opinion in Hannah v. Larche, supra at 493, Justices Harlan
and Clark stated that "the principles established by . . . [these two fourteenth
amendment due process cases] are dispositive of the issues herein . . . ." The
implication is unmistakeable that the two clauses are equated as far as procedural
protection is concerned. The majority's opinion in Hannah (per Warren, C.J.) care-
fully avoided any implied or express determination of this issue by making no mention
of the two fourteenth amendment cases except to note that the majority had chosen
not to treat them. Id. at 451 n.31. Since the Court has failed to make any dis-
tinction betveen the fifth and fourteenth amendments in the procedural area and
certain Justices have indicated their belief that none would be justified, it is appro-
priate not to resolve the cases into fifth and fourteenth amendment categories when
discussing procedural due process.
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cases, licensing cases, and security clearance cases.20  This classification
provides a convenient framework for analyzing the cases in terms of the
usual degree of employment foreclosure resulting from the government
exclusionary action in the typical case in each category. However, this
categorization must not be permitted to obscure the basic distinction among
the cases-the effect of the government exclusionary action upon the indi-
vidual concerned in terms of total or partial foreclosure from his chosen
field of employment. Often, when a government worker is discharged,
even for security reasons, he loses, at most, the ability to hold public em-
ployment; his opportunities for private employment are relatively un-
affected. However, in occupations in which the government acts as the
major employer-the field of education, for example-or when the pub-
licity attendant to firing might seriously stigmatize the discharged indi-
vidual, the resultant foreclosure from employment may be almost total-
or at least involve far more substantial economic prejudice than in most
public employment discharge cases.2 ' Similarly, expulsion from a public
college may result in great injury in terms of foreclosure from further edu-
cation and impairment of employment opportunities. In licensing cases,
in which the government acts not as an employer but as a regulator of
the qualifications for an entire field of private employment to insure some
federal interest, the resultant foreclosure is total. In cases not involving
actual licenses, in which government action may cause the exclusion of a
private worker from employment opportunities for failing to meet security
requirements established by the government for that occupation, the fore-
closure may be either partial or total, depending on whether government
security clearance is only a prerequisite for a particular job or is required
for any employment within an entire trade or profession. Accordingly,
although the customary classification will be employed for convenience,
cases will be analyzed with respect to the extent of foreclosure from
employment.2
20 See JAFFE & NATHANs O, ADMINrsTRATIWv LAw 574, 578, 591 (2d ed. 1961);
cf. DAvis, ADMINIsTRATinv LAW TEXT 131, 138, 139 (1959).
21 A recent study based on personal interviews with public school teachers who
had been discharged by the board of education as an outgrowth of their failure to
answer questions before the House Un-American Activities Committee in 1953 and
1954 supports this contention. It concluded that several dismissed teachers were
almost totally foreclosed from employment in the teaching profession, that those who
were able to secure appointments in private schools suffered a substantial impairment
to their income, and that all of those dismissed who were interviewed, with one
exception, encountered substantial difficulty in obtaining any work and sustained a
significant decrease in their earning capacity. Cohen, McCarthyism: Its Rise, Its
Fall, Its Legacy, pp. 52-73, May 1960 (unpublished thesis in Biddle Law Library,
University of Pennsylvania).
22The cases have not always adhered to the distinction among licensing, public
employment discharge, and security clearance cases. See, e.g., Cafeteria Workers v.
McElroy, 367 U.S. 886, 894, 896-98 (1961) (security clearance case), discussing
Homer v. Richmond, 292 F.2d 719 (D.C. Cir. 1961) (licensing case), Vitarelli v.
Seaton, 359 U.S. 535 (1959), and Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183 (1952) (both
cases involving public employment).
GOVERNMENT EXCLUSIONARY ACTION
A. Public Employment Discharge Cases
In Bailey v. Richardson,2 3 a classic case in the public employment
area, a divided court of appeals held that, since there was no right to
government employment which could qualify as "liberty" or "property"
within the protection of the fifth amendment, a government civil servant in
a nonsensitive position, who had received several formal hearings, could be
discharged on grounds of disloyalty without the opportunity to know the
identity of her accusers or to cross-examine them.24 The Supreme Court
affirmed by an equally divided Court 2 5 Although a year later in Wieman
v. Updegraff26 the Court expressly rejected this privilege doctrine as a
test for determining the degree of due process protection constitutionally
required,2 7 the public employment discharge cases generally have failed to
23182 F.2d 46 (D.C. Cir. 1950), aff'd per curianm by at equally divided Court,
341 U.S. 918 (1951).
24The court of appeals stated that "due process of law is not applicable unless
one is being deprived of something to which he has a right." 182 F.2d at 58. In
Bailey petitioner sought the right of confrontation and cross-examination of those
who had given evidence against her. She had already received a hearing. Therefore,
this case was never direct authority for the proposition that due process does not
require some hearing in order for the government to discharge its own employees
for disloyalty reasons. Bailey has been extended far beyond its factual situation.
See, e.g., Radford v. United States, 264 F.2d 709, 710 (5th Cir. 1959); Haynes v.
Thomas, 232 F.2d 688, 690 (D.C. Cir. 1956); Jason v. Summerfield, 214 F.2d 273,
277 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 840 (1954).
25 341 U.S. 918 (1951). In a case decided by the Supreme Court on the same
day it affirmed Bailey, Mr. justice Douglas expressed his views on Bailey: "Doro-
thy Bailey . . . was on trial for her reputation, her job, her professional standing.
. . . To make that condemnation Without meticulous regard for the decencies of
a fair trial is abhorrent to fundamental justice." Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm.
v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 180 (1951) (Douglas, J., concurring).
26 344 U.S. 183 (1952).
2 7 1d. at 191-92. The Court held that discharge of teachers from a state uni-
versity for refusing to take a loyalty oath, which encompassed innocent as well as
knowing association, violated due process. Compare Adler v. Board of Educ., 342
U.S. 485 (1952), and Garner v. Board of Pub. Works, 341 U.S. 716 (1951), with
Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183, 188-91 (1952). See also Service v. Dulles,
354 U.S. 363 (1957); Peters v. Hobby, 349 U.S. 331 (1955). Recent substantive
due process cases have rejected the privilege doctrine by assuming that due process
of law required some reasonable standards for discharge of state employees. Although
these cases have reached different results on the issue of constitutionality, all recog-
nized that the state cannot employ purely arbitrary practices in discharging its em-
ployees. None of the cases which found no constitutional violation relied upon the
privilege doctrine as the basis for its holding. See Nelson v. County of Los Angeles,
362 U.S. 1 (1960); Lerner v. Casey, 357 U.S. 468 (1958), 57 Mica. L. REv. 412
(1959) ; Beilan v. Board of Pub. Educ., 357 U.S. 399 (1958). Extremely hazy con-
stitutional distinctions have been drawn, however. Compare Slochower v. Board of
Higher Educ., 350 U.S. 551 (1956), 25 FORDHAm L. Rxv. 526, and Board of Pub.
Educ. v. Intille, 401 Pa. 1, 163 A.2d 420, cert. denied, 364 U.S. 910 (1960), with
Nelson v. County of Los Angeles, supra, and Beilan v. Board of Pub. Educ., supra.
See generally 1960 U. ILL. L.F. 341. The Court at one time adhered to the doctrine
that a right to public employment was not "property" Within the meaning of the due
process clause. See, e.g., Taylor v. Beckham, 178 U.S. 548 (1900); cf. Angilly v.
United States, 199 F.2d 642 (2d Cir. 1952). See also Gardner, The Great Charter
d the Case of Angilly v. United States, 67 HARV. L. REv. 1 (1953). The Court
in Wieman did not explain whether the employee's protected interest in his job was
"life, liberty, or property." For additional criticism of the privilege doctrine, see
Davis, The Requirement of a Trial-Type Hearing, 70 HARv. L. REV. 193, 225-32
(1956); Brown & Fassett, Security Tests for Maritime Workers: Due Process
Under the Port Security Program, 62 YALE L.J. 1163, 1192-93 (1953); Note, 63
YALE L.J. 206, 223-29 (1953); Note, 61 Y.ALE L.J. 171, 188-91 (1952); cf. BROWN,
LOYALTY AND SEcuRuri 334-35 (1958).
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articulate what specific procedural or substantive practices will satisfy due
process.28
B. State College Expulsion Cases
The right of notice and hearing before expulsion from public col-
leges 29 has been affirmatively recognized by one county court opinion3 0
and in dictum; 31 most cases have assumed such a right by determining
that the hearing afforded was sufficient.3 2  On the other hand, it has
generally been held that the right to expel lies within the broad discretion
of the college governing authority, and its action will not be disturbed
unless the exercise of discretion as to procedure or substantive grounds
is clearly arbitrary.33  In Steier v. New York State Educ. Comrn'r,'3 the
most recent case prior to Dixon, a court of appeals held that a complaint
alleging that a student's dismissal from a city college was a violation of
the equal protection and due process clauses of the fourteenth amendment
failed to raise a federal question sufficiently substantial to support federal
jurisdiction. However, the authority of this case as to notice and hear-
2 8 No case has yet held that the opportunity for confrontation and cross-examina-
tion must be given to a public employee discharged for loyalty-security reasons.
Both Slochower v. Board of Higher Educ., supra note 27, and Wieman v. Upde-
graff, supra note 27, while holding the government action lacking in due process,
failed to state what substantive and procedural practices would be commensurate
with due process of law. See generally Ass'N OF THE BAR OF THE CITY OF NEW
YoRic, REPORT OF THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON THE FEDERAL LOYALTY-SECURITY
PROGRAM 174-80 (1956); BONTEcOU, THE FEDERAL LOYALTY-SEcURITY PROGRAM
(1953); BROWN, LOYALTY AND SECURITY (1958); YARMOLINSKY, CASE STUDIES IN
PERSONNEL SECURITY (1955) ; Krasnowiecki, Confrontation by Wihesses in Govern-
ment Employee Security Proceedings, 33 NOTRE DAME LAW. 180 (1958).
29 It has been held that a student may be discharged from a private institution
based on the waiver which he signed upon registration. See John B. Stetson Univ.
v. Hunt, 88 Fla. 510, 102 So. 637 (1924); Anthony v. Syracuse Univ., 244 App. Div.
487, 231 N.Y. Supp. 435 (1928). But see Seavey, Dismissal of Students: "Due
Process", 70 HARv. L. REv. 1406 (1957). See also Guillory v. Administrators of
Tulane Univ., 203 F. Supp. 855, 859, 863 (E.D. La. 1962) (dictum).
30 Commonwealth ex rel. Hill v. McCauley, 3 Pa. County Ct. 77 (C.P. 1887).
This case goes further than the textual statement, although not on due process
grounds, by requiring an opportunity for the expelled student to meet his accusers.
a See Gleason v. University of Minn., 104 Minn. 359, 116 N.W. 650 (1908)
(dictum); State ex rel. Sherman v. Hyman, 180 Tenn. 99, 171 S.W.2d 822 (1942)
(dictum), cert. denied, 319 U.S. 748 (1943). Contra, State ex rel. Ingersoll v. Clapp,
81 Mont. 200, 263 Pac. 433, cert. denied, 277 U.S. 591, error dismissed, 278 U.S. 661
(1928).
32 See, e.g., Tanton v. McKenney, 226 Mich. 245, 197 N.W. 510 (1924). See
also Hamilton v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 293 U.S. 245 (1934) (attendance at state
university conditioned upon participation in ROTC program); Waugh v. Board of
Trustees, 237 U.S. 589 (1915) (diploma refused if student is a member of banned
fraternity). See generally Seavey, supra note 29.
33 See, e.g., Robinson v. University of Miami, 100 So. Zd 442 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1958); Tanton v. McKenney, 226 Mich. 245, 197 N.W. 510 (1924); State ex
rel. Ingersoll v. Clapp, 81 Mont. 200, 263 Pac. 433, cert. denied, 277 U.S. 591, error
dismissed, 278 U.S. 661 (1928).
34271 F.2d 13 (2d Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 966 (1960). Appellant's
principle constitutional contention was that he had been denied substantive due process
because of the arbitrary nature of his expulsion. judge Clark, in dissent, found that
the complaint justified jurisdiction by alleging a denial of equal protection and sub-
stantive due process but did not mention any colorable procedural grounds. Id. at 22.
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ing 35 is limited by the fact that the student was given extensive warnings
and several formal hearings before he was expelled.3 6
C. Licensing Cases
In licensing cases dealing with a denial of the opportunity to engage
in a chosen private profession, the courts have better articulated what pro-
cedural protection must be afforded.37 In Parker v. Lester,38 a court of
appeals held that procedures,3 9 established under a security program au-
thorized by Congress and the President,40 were deficient in due process
because they deprived merchant seamen of their entire field of employment
without providing for notice and fair hearing. The court, by facing the
due process question without searching for the specific "liberty" or "prop-
erty" deprivations, recognized sub silentio that the Bailey privilege doc-
trine failed to reach the crux of the problem. 41 The appellants had been
given an appellate-type hearing and the opportunity to present their own
evidence before a local appeal board following the notice of government
noncertification, but they were never apprised of the specific grounds for
the government action, nor confronted with the Government's case.4 The
court of appeals indicated that in order to deny appellants their chosen
profession in accordance with due process of law, confrontation and cross-
examination would here be required.
4 3
35 See note 83 infra.
36 The majority, 271 F.2d at 18, is guilty of making the extremely sweeping
statement which is cited in the dissent in Dixon, 294 F.2d at 164-65: "Education is
a field of life reserved to the individual states. The only restriction the Federal
Government imposes is that in their educational program no state may discriminate
against an individual because of race, color or creed."
37 See Goldsmith v. United States Bd. of Tax Appeals, 270 U.S. 117, 123 (1926)
(dictum). See also Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners, 353 U.S. 232 (1957);
Konigsberg v. State Bar, 353 U.S. 252 (1957). Compare Minkoff v. Payne, 210
F.2d 689 (D.C. Cir. 1953), with Walker v. City of Clinton, 244 Iowa 1099, 59
N.W.2d 785 (1953). See generally Davis, supra note 27, at 262-74.
38 227 F.2d 708 (9th Cir. 1955), 104 U. PA. L. REv. 703 (1956).
39 15 Fed. Reg. 9327 (1950), as amended, 16 Fed. Reg. 817 (1951), as amended,
16 Fed. Reg. 6868 (1951), as amended, 16 Fed. Reg. 8846 (1951), as amended, 17
Fed. Reg. 658 (1952), as amended, 17 Fed. Reg. 5040 (1952), as amended, 18 Fed.
Reg. 3418 (1953), as amended, 18 Fed. Reg. 6941 (1953). This last amendment was
made by the Coast Guard to comply with the district court decree which the court of
appeals found, in reversing, not sufficiently protective of the seamen's interests.
40 See note 6 supra.
41 Parker v. Lester, 227 F.2d 708, 717 (9th Cir. 1955), reversing 112 F. Supp.
433, 439 (N.D. Cal. 1953).
42Id. at 711. See also YARMOLINSKY, op. cit. supra note 28, at 57. The court
concurred in the trial court finding, 112 F. Supp. at 439, that "'the board members,
themselves, had no personal knowledge of the reliability and veracity of the in-
formers . . . '" 227 F.2d at 711-12 n.6.
431d. at 715-22. Compare the district court opinion, 112 F. Supp. at 444. The
Coast Guard amended its regulations to provide for notice "as specific and detailed
as the interests of national security shall permit . . . [including] . . . names,
dates, and places in such detail as to permit reasonable answer," and hearing pro-
cedure in which the appellant will be given the opportunity to present evidence in
support of his defense, to examine those witnesses appearing, and in which "every
effort should be made to produce material witnesses to testify . . ." in support of
the Commandant's decision and to have these witnesses available for confrontation
1962]
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D. Security Clearance Cases
In Greene v. McElroy "-an example of total exclusion from a chosen
profession because of government noncertification-, a high-ranking execu-
tive was foreclosed from highly skilled private employment because the
government had revoked his security clearance. The Supreme Court but-
tressed the reasoning in Parker, stating in dictum that "the right to hold
specific private employment and to follow a chosen profession free from
unreasonable governmental interference comes within the 'liberty' and
'property' concepts of the Fifth Amendment." 45 In finding that the pro-
cedures whereby the individual had been excluded were unauthorized, the
Court held that when the administrative action has raised "serious" due
process problems, express presidential or congressional authorization,
rather than mere implied sanction, is necessary to sustain the procedures
used.4 6  In public as well as private employment discharge cases, the
Greene rule and dictum have begun to influence judicial examination of
the protection accorded to those discharged.47 Greene had appeared before
two government security boards for hearings at which, in response to
questions posed by the boards, he was permitted to explain his prior
activities but was never apprised of the contents or sources of secret reports
and cross-examination by the applicant. 33 C.F.R. §§ 121.11(a), .19(f) (Supp. 1961).
These procedures would have clearly been of some benefit to the appellants in Parker
by permitting revelation of certain informants and their charges; but since the reports
on which the appeal board and the Commandant based their determinations were
supplied to the Coast Guard by an independent investigative agency, it is doubtful
whether the source or the nature of this crucial information would have been dis-
closed.
44360 U.S. 474 (1959), 44 MiN. L. Rzv. 771 (1960). See Raub, Non-Con-
frontation in Security Cases: The Greene Decision, 45 VA. L. REv. 1175 (1959);
The Supreme Court, 1958 Term, 73 HARv. L. REv. 84, 196-200 (1959). See generally
Note, Due Process and the "Right" to a Job, 46 VA. L. REv. 323 (1960).
45 360 U.S. at 492 (dictum). The Court held that the Defense Department had
not been given authority by either Congress or the President to establish the program
in question; therefore, it was unnecessary to reach the constitutional question. See
id. at 509 (concurring opinion), in which Mr. Justice Harlan noted that the majority
(per Warren, C.J.) "unnecessarily deals with the very issue it disclaims deciding."
46 Id. at 507.
47 Bland v. Connally, 293 F.2d 852, 857 (D.C. Cir. 1961), and Davis v. Stahr,
293 F.2d 860, 864 (D.C. Cir. 1961), two recent cases involving discharges of in-
active reservists from military service under conditions less than honorable, have
cited Greene as controlling their determinations that, in the absence of express au-
thorization from Congress or the President, such discharges could not be granted
on the basis of secret information not produced at hearings. In Cafeteria Workers
v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886, 889-90 (1961), the Court adhered to the Greene rule
calling for express authorization from Congress or the President in order for the
Government to cause an employee's discharge without affording her full procedural
protection. In Reed v. Franke, 297 F.2d 17, 26-27 (4th Cir. 1961), a case involving
an honorable discharge of a veteran seaman for "unsuitability," a court of appeals
examined the Greene dictum but found it not "controlling" since Congress had
accorded procedural protection sufficient to satisfy due process by providing for
a subsequent appeal with full hearing before a board of review. Beard v. Stahr,
200 F. Supp. 766, 775 (D.D.C. 1961), vacated with directions to dimniss, 30 U.S.L.
W= 3870 (U.S. May 28, 1962), distinguished the Greene dictum as not requiring
confrontation and cross-examination of adverse witnesses before an army officer could
be dismissed through administrative proceedings.
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on which most of the allegations and the final determination were based
or confronted by the Government's case. The Government based its
action on confidential information that Greene had associated with known
sympathizers of the Communist party and belonged to and supported sus-
pect groups. Strong language in the Court's opinion stressed the right
to confrontation and cross-examination under these circumstances.
48
Last term, in Cafeteria Workers v. McElroy,49 a closely divided
Court 5 seemingly retreated from the dictum, although not the rule, in
Greene5 ' by holding that a short-order cook, employed in a private cafe-
teria on a military installation, was not denied due process of law under
the fifth amendment in being summarily deprived of access to the installa-
tion for security reasons 52 under a duly authorized security program
53
which did not provide for notice or hearing. Again, the Court did not
48360 U.S. at 496-99 (dictum). Without such procedural protection it would
seem that when the board chooses to believe the informants rather than the appli-
cant, he cannot adequately defend himself. Support was given to this contention
following the Greene decision when the President promulgated a new set of regu-
lations for "Safeguarding Classified Information Within Industry." Exec. Order
No. 10865, 25 Fed. Reg. 1583 (1960). These regulations in part provided for a
written statement to the applicant with reasons for denial of access as "comprehen-
sive and detailed as the national security permits," and the opportunity to examine
witnesses who have supplied information adverse to him. Exec. Order No. 10865,
§§3, 4, 25 Fed. Reg. 1583 (1960). Also, the statements of such confidential wit-
nesses may be received against the applicant without the opportunity for confrontation
or cross-examination only if the head of the department which supplied the infor-
mation certifies that it was gathered by a confidential agent, the disclosure of whose
identity "would be substantially harmful to the national interest," and if the head
of the department administering the program finds the statement "reliable and ma-
terial" and that failure to receive it would "be substantially harmful to the national
security . . . ." Exec. Order No. 10865, § 4(a) (1), (2), 25 Fed. Reg. 1583 (1960).
The final decision on that applicant must then be made by the head of the department
administering the program with due consideration for the lack of opportunity for
the applicant to confront and cross-examine. Exec. Order No. 10865, § 4(b) (2),
25 Fed. Reg. 1583 (1960). The ultimate situation is provided for in § 9 of these
regulations:
Nothing contained in this order shall be deemed to limit or affect the re-
sponsibility and powers of the head of a department to deny or revoke access
to a specific classification category if the security of the nation so requires.
Such authority may not be delegated and may be exercised only when the
head of a department determines that the procedures prescribed in sections 3,
4, and 5 cannot be invoked consistently with the national security and such
determination shall be conclusive.
25 Fed. Reg. at 1584.
49 367 U.S. 886 (1961), 36 N.Y.U.L. REv. 506, 36 NOTRE DAME LAW. 576.
50 Stewart, 3., wrote for the five-justice majority; Brennan, J., wrote a dissenting
opinion in which Warren, CJ., Black and Douglas, JJ., concurred.
51367 U.S. at 889-90. The Court expressly adopted the rule in Greene to test
the legislative and executive authorization.
52367 U.S. at 888; see Brief for Petitioners, p. 7.
5
3 The Court found the security program authorized initially through the dele-
gation to Congress in article I, § 8 of the Constitution and to the President in article
II, §2 of the Constitution, by 10 U.S.C. §5031(a), (c) (1958), and by article 0734
of the Navy Regulations, which were expressly approved by President Truman on
August 9, 1948, in accordance with 10 U.S.C. § 6011 (1958), and also "in the light of
the historically unquestioned power of a commanding officer summarily to exclude
civilians from the area of his command . . . ." 367 U.S. at 890-94.
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base its holding on the privilege doctrine m but balanced the private in-
terest impaired 55 against the government power exercised 56 and deter-
mined that the extent of deprivation involved was extremely slight since
the petitioner's employment opportunities had in no way been limited.
57
Accordingly, any impairment of the government power exercised would
be unwarranted.58
II. BALANCING THE INTEREST REPRESENTED BY THE INDIvIDUAL AGAINST
THE INTEREST REPRESENTED BY THE GOVERNMENT
A. Minimal Notice and Hearing
The results in Homer and Dixon follow logically from Parker and the
Greene dictum, but superficially appear contrary to Cafeteria Workers.
However, their different results are consistent when the cases are analyzed
in terms of a balance between the interests of the individual--determined
by ascertaining the predictable injury to the individual in terms both of
economic prejudice and of impairment of substantive constitutional rights
through the penalizing of past behavior which might have been constitu-
tionally protected and through the deterrent effect on others of such pen-
alties-and the government interest-determined by considering the pre-
54 The Court recognized that "this question cannot be answered by easy assertion
that, because she had no constitutional right to be there in the first place, she was
not deprived of liberty or property by the Superintendent's action." Id. at 894. The
privilege doctrine is only a superficial tautology: "[W]henever a governmental body
acts so as to injure an individual, the Constitution requires that the act be consonant
with due process of law." Dixon v. Alabama State Bd. of Educ., 294 F.2d 150, 155
(5th Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 930 (1961). See also HART & WECHSLER, THE
FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEm 332-34 (1953). It is true, of course,
that what is "due" will vary according to the governmental and individual interests
involved. See Cafeteria Workers v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886, 895 (1961) ; Joint Anti-
Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 162-63 (1951) (Frankfurter, J.,
concurring).
-5 It can be inferred from the Court's reasoning, 367 U.S. at 898-99, that there
was an underlying feeling that petitioner would have been more prejudiced in em-
ployment opportunities by disclosure of the specific reasons for her exclusion from
the installation. By implying that procedural requirements might have a deleterious
rather than a protective effect, the Court has forgotten that the reasons for requesting
procedural safeguards must be determined by the individual and that it is for the
Government to decide only whether it is desirable or constitutionally compelled to
accord those protections, not to attempt to rethink the petitioner's decision of what
is in her own best interests.
S6"[T]he governmental function operating here was not the power to regulate
or license, as a lawmaker, an entire trade or profession, or to control an entire branch
of private business . . . ." Id. at 896.
57 In a footnote the Court pointed out that "in oral argument government counsel
emphatically represented that denial of access to the Gun Factory would not 'by law
or in fact' prevent Rachel Brawner from obtaining employment on any other federal
property." Id. at 899 n.10. The Court, therefore, distinguished this case from
Wieman on the grounds that "this is not a case where government action has operated
to bestow a badge of disloyalty or infamy, with an attendant foreclosure from other
employment opportunity." Id. at 898.
58 The Court appeared also to say that since substantive due process requirements
have been met-the announced grounds were "entirely rational"-petitioner had no
right to the safeguards of procedural due process. Id. at 898. This reasoning was
vigorously attacked by the dissent. Id. at 900-01.
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cise nature of the interest involved, the power exercised, and the potential
impairment of both by according notice and hearing.59
1. The Interest Represented by the Individual
Predictable Economic Injury
In determining the economic injury involved in the exclusionary ac-
tion cases, the courts have looked almost without exception to that injury
which was sustained in fact.60  However, examination of the actual injury
which was suffered can be a misleading venture. Its only legitimate pur-
pose is to demonstrate by particularizing under certain circumstances what
economic injury should have been foreseeable-the probability or possi-
bility that severe or appreciable economic injury would result from the
government action. For these purposes, an "appreciable" economic in-
jury is defined in terms of substantial difficulty in obtaining similar employ-
ment within the chosen field. "Severe" injury encompasses either an
almost total foreclosure of chosen employment or significant economic
prejudice in terms of decrease in earning capacity. What injury actually
did occur in the particular case will usually be indicative of what might
most reasonably have been anticipated as the effect of the government ac-
tion upon the individual. 6 ' In both Homer and Cafeteria Workers, the
actual economic injury suffered was predictable with reasonable certainty.
In Homer, if the applicants were not licensed, they would be precluded
from all Merchant Marine employment in their chosen vocation of radio-
telegraph operator-a severe economic injury. This is exactly what oc-
curred. Further, their particular technical competence, as evidenced by
the terms of their FCC license, quite narrowly limited their opportunities
for other similar employment . 2  In Cafeteria Workers, the most reason-
59 In Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 163 (1951),
Frankfurter, J., in concurrence stated:
[Flair play . . . cannot, therefore, be tested by mere generalities or
sentiments abstractly appealing. The precise nature of the interest that has
been adversely affected, the manner in which this was done, the reasons for
doing it, the available alternatives to the procedure that was followed, the
protection implicit in the office of the functionary whose conduct is chal-
lenged, the balance of hurt complained of and good accomplished-these are
some of the considerations that must enter into the judicial judgment.
60 See Cafeteria Workers v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886, 888, 896, 898-99 (1961);
Greene v. McElroy, 360 U.S. 474, 486-87, 492 (1959), reversing 254 F.2d 944, 952-53
(D.C. Cir. 1958) ; Homer v. Richmond, 292 F.2d 719, 722 (D.C. Cir. 1961) ; Parker
v. Lester, 227 F.2d 708, 713 (9th Cir. 1955). But see Wieman v. Updegraff, 344
U.S. 183, 190-91 (1952); Dixon v. Alabama State Bd. of Educ., 294 F.2d 150, 157
(5th Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 930 (1961).
61 The initial prediction of probable economic injury must be made by the regu-
lation drafter or administrator of the program. A court, faced with the problem
of whether in a certain factual setting the requirements of due process have been
provided, must judge this prior determination of probable or possible effect upon the
individual and, in so doing, establish more fully articulated standards by which future
administrative decisions as to the requirements of due process can be made correctly.
62 See Joint Appendix to Briefs of Appellants and Appellee, pp. 56a-57a, Homer
v. Richmond, 292 F.2d 719 (D.C. Cir. 1961).
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able prediction was that as a result of the government action the short-
order cook would encounter little difficulty in obtaining similar work in her
chosen field and, therefore, would lose employment only at that particular
cafeteria-which the Court in fact determined was the result of the govern-
ment action.6s There was, therefore, only a possibility of appreciable
economic injury and only a slight possibility of severe economic injury.
It is highly unlikely that a short-order cook would have extreme difficulty
in securing other employment as a cook or sustain a substantial decrease
in earning capacity as a result of the government action. In addition, be-
cause of both the close relation to national security of the chosen occupa-
tions of appellants in Homer " and the more specific delineation of the
charges against them, the stigma which attached to them by their being
denied a license because of alleged extensive communist activities 65 in-
volved far more danger of potential economic prejudice to them than would
any unfavorable inferences which might be drawn from the cook's exclu-
sion for security reasons in Cafeteria Workers.66 Thus, in Homer, proba-
bility of not only appreciable but severe economic injury as a result of the
government action should be placed on the side of the balance representing
the individual interest; whereas, in Cafeteria Workers, the individual in-
terest must be characterized as only a possibility of appreciable and a
slight possibility of severe economic injury. There was very little evidence
offered in Dixon of the actual extent of the economic injury suffered.
67
In determining the predictable extent of the economic injury which might
be sustained, hindsight reveals only that the expelled students lost the
opportunity to attend the particular college, just as the short-order cook
lost her particular employment. However, it is probable that a student
expelled from college will encounter considerable difficulty in securing ad-
mission to other colleges and in obtaining future employment 8-certainly
63The Court stated: "[T]he private interest affected . . .most assuredly was
not the right to follow a chosen trade or profession. . . . Rachel Brawner remained
entirely free to obtain employment as a short-order cook or to get any other job
. . . . All that was denied her was the opportunity to work at one isolated and
specific military installation." 367 U.S. at 895-96. Petitioner was in fact offered
employment in another restaurant operated by her employer but refused this job
because the location was inconvenient. Id. at 888.
64 Much employment in the radiotelegraph communications field has some con-
nection with national security, and appellants, charged with extensive subversive
associations, would doubtless be unemployable in a good number of the positions in
this entire field.
65 See note 9 supra.
66 The Court evidently determined that in fact no rational basis for suspicions
of disloyalty was present in the government's exclusionary action. 367 U.S. at 899.
But see Cafeteria Workers v. McElroy, 284 F.2d 173, 193 (D.C. Cir. 1960) (Fahy,
J., dissenting).
67 This is mainly because of the relative swiftness with which the case came to
trial. The court did find that the students "would .. .be injured by the inter-
ruption of their course of studies in mid-term." Dixon v. Alabama State Bd. of
Educ., 294 F.2d 150, 157 (5th Cir. 1961).
68The court stated, "It is most unlikely that a public college would accept a
student expelled from another public college of the same state. Indeed, expulsion
may well prejudice the student in completing his education at any other institution."
Ibid. If the student in question is dependent on state subsidy, and if, because of his
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an appreciable injury. If the government action deprives him of the op-
portunity to attend any college-a possible result-the limitation on em-
ployment and the attendant economic prejudice will be severe.
69
Effect on Substantive Constitutional Rights
Government exclusionary action, through economic injury, may also
jeopardize other constitutional rights by penalizing activity which may be
constitutionally protected. When the exercise of constitutionally pro-
tected rights might be so penalized by government action, due process may
require more procedural safeguards for the individual in order to deter-
mine whether these rights were in fact abridged.7 0  The constitutional
rights of the individual are important both to the individual concerned and
to that portion of the public which might be deterred from pursuing a
constitutionally protected course of conduct.71
In Homer, the appellants' rights of free association and freedom of
belief may well have been impaired by the failure to accord them the op-
portunity to explain their previous conduct in answer to charges of Com-
munist party membership, associations, or activities. Although the court
stated that the charged activities would be sufficient substantive grounds to
justify the Commandant's action,72 the absence of the opportunity to
demonstrate the falsity of the charges posed a severe threat 3 to possibly
constitutionally protected behavior.74 Further, if Homer had held that the
Government could deny certification to appellants without any notice or
hearing, persons who might be engaged in or contemplating the same or
race, fewer private or public educational institutions are open to him, his expulsion
will be even more serious. A bare notation of expulsion, without inclusion of the
grounds on which the college action was based, would probably prove more prejudicial
to the student's future job opportunities than would a notation articulating the reasons
for the expulsion. In contrast, an employee who has been fired arbitrarily will probably
be less prejudiced than one fired for specific, publicized security reasons.
69The court stated, 'Without sufficient education the plaintiffs would not be
able to earn an adequate livelihood, to enjoy life to the fullest, or to fulfill as com-
pletely as possible the duties and responsibilities of good citizens." Ibid. This injury
may be more severe in the case of a Negro whose ability to secure any well-paid
employment may be almost entirely dependent on his possession of a college diploma.
70 See Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 521 (1958) ("When the State undertakes
to restrain unlawful advocacy it must provide procedures which are adequate to safe-
guard against infringement of constitutionally protected rights . . ."); cf. Cant-
well v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 308-11 (1940); Garner v. Louisiana, 368 U.S.
157, 200-07 (1961) (Harlan, J., concurring). See generally Note, The Void-For-
Vagieess Doctrinw in the Supreme Court, 109 U. PA. L. REv. 67, 75-85, 99-104
(1960).
71 Cf. United States v. Wood, 295 F.2d 772, 780 (5th Cir. 1961), pelition for
cert. filed, 30 U.S.L. WEEx 3274 (U.S. Feb. 27, 1962) (No. 753). This effect on
the exercise of other constitutional rights, either those of the individual concerned
or of others in similar situations, has never been judicially recognized as an appro-
priate factor to place on the balance on behalf of the interest represented by the
individual.
72 Homer v. Richmond, 292 F.2d 719, 723-24 (D.C. Cir. 1961).
73 The severity of the penalty must always be measured by the extent of pre-
dictable economic injury-in Homer a probability of severe injury.
74 Cf. Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 520-29 (1958).
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similarly regulated employment would probably be deterred from free asso-
ciation with individuals and organizations because they feared that they
someday might be subject to noncertification without opportunity to estab-
lish the innocence of their prior activities.
In Cafeteria Workers, the cook, by being afforded no opportunity to
deny or explain away any charges which might be levied against her, may
suffer some penalty for activities which might have been protected by
freedom of belief and association. However, since it was probable that
she could obtain other employment, the severity of this penalty is not
great. Nor would others be likely to be deterred from protected activities
by the decision; the relatively mild penalty combined with the very gen-
eral "security reasons" explanation for the exclusion would not excite the
same public apprehension which might have been aroused by the specif-
ically enumerated alleged activities in Homer.
The students in Dixon were penalized for engaging in sit-ins at lunch
counters in a publicly owned building,75 an activity which may come within
the constitutional protection of fourteenth amendment equal protection 76
and first amendment freedom of speech.77 The penalty here, measured in
terms of predictable economic injury, is quite substantial. 78 Also, it is
probable that similar students, in fear of expulsion without opportunity to
justify their actions, may be deterred from engaging in these activities.
2. The Interest Represented by the Government
The nature of the government power exercised in each of the cases
must also be considered. In Homer, the Government, operating in a field
extrinsic to essential government operation on the basis of the admiralty
and maritime powers, assumed the role of licensing all who sought to pur-
sue a particular private employment. In Cafeteria Workers, by determin-
ing the right of access to the installation of a person privately employed
on government property, the Government was exercising its historic right
to manage the internal affairs of a military establishment 79-- an exercise
of power inherent in a sovereign nation. In Dixon, the state was also exer-
cising its proprietary power, but a less fundamental one than in Cafeteria
Workers-the management of a state college. In both Homer and Cafe-
teria Workers, the Government concern which had motivated the action
75 Dixon v. Alabama State Bd. of Educ., 294 F.2d 150, 152 (5th Cir. 1961). All
of the expelled students participated in a sit-in "in the lunch grill located in the base-
ment of the Montgomery County Courthouse."
7 6 See Turner v. City of Memphis, 369 U.S. 350 (1962) (per curiam) ; Burton
v. Wilmington Parking Authority, 365 U.S. 715, 723-26 (1961). Turner and Burton
make it clear that the students would have had a right to be served at the courthouse
grill lunch counter but do not necessarily give them the right to demonstrate in
numbers to obtain that service.
77 See Garner v. Louisiana, 368 U.S. 157, 201-03 (1961) (Harlan, J., concurring).
7s See notes 67-69 supra and accompanying text.
79 Cafeteria Workers v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886, 892-94 (1961); cf. Perkins v.
Lukens Steel Co., 310 U.S. 113, 129 (1940). See also Vitarelli v. Seaton, 359 U.S.
535, 539 (1959) (dictum). Compare Greene v. McElroy, 360 U.S. 474, 493-94 (1959).
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was its interest in national security. In Homer, the concern was for secu-
rity in a general sense; in Cafeteria Workers, the Government acted to
protect the security of the particular base as well as overall national secu-
rity. In this sense, the government action there was more closely inter-
related with the government power exercised than in Homer. In Dixon,
the government power exercised was motivated by an important but not
preeminent concern-the maintenance of the educational atmosphere of the
college.
Part of the threat to the government interest in both Homer and
Cafeteria Workers was that requiring notice of charges in detail might
endanger national security by revealing confidential sources-clearly not a
concern in Dixon. However, in all of the cases, establishing and main-
taining a program providing notice and hearing would entail a certain
amount of government time, trouble, and expense, which must be weighed
against the individual interests supporting such notice and hearing.
On the other hand, the Government also has a positive interest in
providing fair hearing procedures in order both to reach the best decision 8 0
and to appear to its citizens to be fair. In Homer and Cafeteria Workers,
the government interest, as well as protecting confidential information in
the interests of national security, includes providing a program which offers
to the individual maximum protection consistent with national security.8 '
This positive concern may reduce any impairment which might result from
the inconvenience in providing the program. In Dixon, the state's positive
interest in determining the truth, in maintaining a feeling of student con-
fidence in the fairness of the administration, and, above all, in promoting
the free exchange of ideas in the college community neutralizes any im-
pairment to the exercised state power due to inconvenience.82
3. Conclusion
Thus, in Homer, the interest of the individual-stated in terms of a
probability of severe economic injury, severe penalty for past behavior
which might have been constitutionally protected, and the likely deterrence
of others in a similar position from constitutionally protected conduct-
justifies the risk to national security and the hindrance of the govern-
mental prerogative which would result from according notice and hearing.
In Cafeteria Workers the relatively slight individual interest-only a slight
80 Cf. 10 C.F.R. § 4.32 (1959) (Atomic Energy Commission regulation requiring
"due recognition to . . . the value of the individual's services to the atomic energy
program . . ."); Ass'N OF THE BAR OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK, REPORT OF THE
SPECIAL COMMITrEE ON THE FEDERAL LOYALTY-SECURITY PROGRAm 149-51 (1956)
(recommending that "due weight . . . [should be given] to the value of the indi-
vidual to the public service.")
81The first amendment manifests the government's interest in promoting the
free interchange of ideas, especially political ones. See Roth v. United States, 354
U.S. 476, 484 (1957) (dictum).
82 Such interests probably explain the almost invariable practice of colleges to
provide at least some type of notice and hearing. See notes 30-32 mipra and accom-
panying text.
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possibility of appreciable economic injury, a slight penalty for past be-
havior which might have been constitutionally protected, and little possi-
bility of a deterrent effect-does not merit endangering the national secu-
rity to the extent which would have been necessitated if notice and hearing
were to be accorded. And in Dixon, the not insubstantial individual in-
terest-a probability of at least appreciable economic injury, a significant
penalty for possibly constitutionally protected behavior and a probable de-
terrence of similar students from engaging in constitutionally protected
conduct-warrants the requirement of notice and hearing since, as has
been suggested, the importance of public fairness in the educational process
more than offsets the inconvenience of granting a hearing-which incon-
venience is the only justification for denying notice and hearing in the
Dixon area. Thus, the results of the three cases are consistent: in Cafe-
teria Workers, the government's fundamental power and paramount secu-
rity concern overbalance the relatively insubstantial individual interest; the
extremely important interests represented by the individual in Homer out-
weigh the strong government interest; and in Dixon the minimal govern-
ment interest is overcome by at least a substantial individual interest. The
facts of both Homer and Dixon call for at least minimal notice and hear-
ing; the circumstances of Cafeteria Workers do not.
83
83 A requirement of notice and hearing cannot be understood as embodying one
combination of procedural safeguards in every case in which a court determines that
procedural due process requires notice and hearing. "Hearing" must be examined
in the specific factual context of each case. "Notice" is a more static concept which
generally requires that a written statement, containing specific charges and the
grounds on which they are based, be delivered to the individual whose employment
is in jeopardy sufficiently in advance of final determination of his case to enable him
to prepare his defense to the charges and their grounds; but it also depends in some
measure on the factual circumstances of each case. In some cases, usually dependent
on the type of hearing which will be required, notice might have to include an
enumeration of the sources of the government's charges, revelation of informants'
names, and the nature of the information that they supplied. Under a particular set
of facts no form of notice or hearing whatever may be demanded by procedural due
process. See joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 162-63
(1951) (concurring opinion), for a discussion of due process as a relative concept.
An administrative hearing which would be commensurate with due process of law
under varying factual circumstances could entail any or all of the following pro-
tections: the right to be represented by counsel; the right to meet by oral argument
the charges detailed in the notice; the right to present a defense to the charges
by oral and documentary evidence; the right to subpoena reluctant witnesses for
direct testimony; and the right to be confronted at the hearing with the government's
case or to be granted a subpoena power over government informants in order to
subject them to cross-examination. In Homer and Dixz, it could be maintained
that some form of notice was given, see text accompanying notes 84, 91 infra, but in
Cafeteria Workers there was none, 367 U.S. at 897. In all three cases, however,
since none of the appellants received any official hearings prior to the government
exclusionary action, their due process contentions could be limited to demands for
a minimal type of hearing; in none of these cases did appellants have to detail the
specific nature of the hearing which they were arguing was required by due process
of law. However, to comprehend the significance of the due process which the
Homer and Dizon courts required of the government, an examination should be
made of the specific type of hearing which the Constitution would require of the
government in order to protect the interests of appellants in both cases. The abstract
determination that due process of law requires some notice and some hearing under
the circumstances involved in those cases fails to clarify the particular protections
which the Constitution does and does not require in the fifth and fourteenth amend-
ment due process clauses.
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B. The Extent of the Notice and Hearing Required
To determine how much notice and hearing is required by the facts
of each case, an examination should be made of what procedures were
afforded, how additional procedures would have benefited the individual,
and whether that benefit would justify the impairment to the government
power and interest involved necessitated by affording that degree of notice
and hearing. In Homer, the only procedural protection consisted of finally
informing the rejected applicants of the grounds on which the Coast Guard
based its findings.8 The Government had acted on the basis of informa-
tion about the individuals' past activities and associations. When past
behavior is questioned, it is often difficult to locate the witnesses and docu-
mentary evidence necessary to disprove the charges. Thus, without notice
of the events on which the Government was concentrating to draw its con-
clusions and the specific charges being levied against the individuals, little
could be done in their defense. Given this data in the notice and a hearing
complete except for the right of confrontation and cross-examination, the
applicants might have been able to defend themselves by some affirmative
proof of their behavior during the period in their past on which the
Government was focusing its attack. However, even these procedures
might not have enabled them to provide an adequate defense; confronta-
tion and cross-examination might have been needed. But such a hearing
could be extremely costly to the Government by forcing disclosure of
undercover agents. The most reasonable program under the facts of
Homer would be to require full procedural protection unless it should be
determined that the revelation of confidential sources would seriously im-
pair national security.8 5 Much of this procedural protection was actually
instituted by the Coast Guard for noncommissioned merchant seamen as a
result of the Parker decision.8 6 Similarly, after Greene, the President
inaugurated an industrial personnel security program which provided that
there would be full disclosure of confidential information and sources un-
less the head of the department supplying the information determined that
the disclosure of the identity of confidential agents "would be substantially
harmful to the national interest," and that the final decision on any indi-
vidual who was refused disclosure because of such determination could be
made only by the head of the department administering the program or
his special designee.8 7 By insuring that these crucial decisions will be made
by high level executives, this program offers a protection to the individual
which is commensurate with due process of law in striking an appropriate
balance between the interests represented by the individual and the
Government.
84 See note 9 upra.
85 See note 43 vtpra.
86 Ibid.
87 See note 48 supra.
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The court of appeals in Dixon, by detailing specific procedures which
would be required by due process under the factual circumstances of the
case, 8 departed from the normal judicial practice when procedures are
found to be deficient in due process safeguards.89 The students were in
fact given no hearing prior to their expulsion; they received no notice prior
to the state action except for warnings-both general and personal-from
the college president to refrain from participation in further activities which
might disrupt college order, other students' studies, or the studies of the
participating students. 90 Each was sent a letter by the college president
informing him of his expulsion and containing the regulations governing
expulsion which had been adopted and published by the state board of
education.9 ' The district court found that all of the expelled students par-
ticipated in at least one of the demonstrations and that several took part
in the other activities. 92  These findings do not appear to have been
controverted by the students.9 3 Thus, the question for decision at the
hearing would be whether, under the regulations, the students' actions were
of such a nature as to justify expulsion." Their motives and reasons for
organizing and participating in the activities would have been essential to
a determination of whether their conduct had been insubordinate.9 5 For
this purpose, a hearing at which they could have presented their version
of the facts and explained their actions would have afforded minimum
protection. Further, since, as the court pointed out, the testimony of wit-
nesses about segregation demonstrations would be likely to be colored by
their particular points of view,96 it would seem that in order to enable the
88 Dixon v. Alabama State Bd. of Educ., 294 F.2d 150, 159 (5th Cir. 1961).
89 See Parker v. Lester, 227 F.2d 708, 723-24 (9th Cir. 1955).
90 294 F.2d at 152 n.3, 161.
91 Id. at 151-52 n.2. The Alabama State Board of Education Regulations included
in the letter from the college president were:
Pupils may be expelled from any of the Colleges: a. For willful disobedience
to the rules and regulations established for the conduct of the schools.
b. For willful and continued neglect of studies and continued failure to main-
tain the standards of efficiency required by the rules and regulations.
c. For Conduct Prejudicial to the School and for Conduct Unbecoming a
Student or Future Teacher in Schools of Alabama, for Insubordination and
Insurrection, or for Inciting Other Pupils to Like Conduct.
d. For any conduct involving moral turpitude.
In the notice received by the students the words in paragraph "c" were capitalized.
92 Dixon v. Alabama State Bd. of Educ., 186 F. Supp. 945, 947-48 (M.D Ala.
1960).
93 The dissenting opinion in Dixon, 294 F.2d at 163, noted "that only one of the
appellants took the witness stand in the court below, although they all announced
at the outset that they were ready for trial and manifestly were present in court.
Their presence and participation in all which transpired was shown by believable
evidence and circumstances and stand wholly undenied."
94 Cf. Knight v. State Bd. of Educ., 200 F. Supp. 174 (M.D. Tenn. 1961).
Most likely an argument on penalty for constitutionally protected activity would
not be raised at the administrative hearing; but it would be relevant if the admin-
istrator would entertain it.
95 See note 91 supra.
96 Dixon v. Alabama State Bd. of Educ., 294 F.2d 150, 158-59 (5th Cir. 1961).
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students to prepare an adequate defense, they should be supplied with the
names and the substance of the testimony of the witnesses against them.
The court decided that all this procedural protection was required by due
process; however, it did not require the further protection of confrontation
and cross-examination at the hearing 7 since it was concerned-legiti-
mately so-with the effect of detrimental publicity 98 on the college.99
However, this danger could have been minimized by combining a full hear-
ing with safeguards against disorderly behavior which might discredit the
college. This procedure would have afforded maximum protection to the
students' interests, and, unlike the situation of revelation of confidential
sources facing the Government in the licensing and public employment
discharge cases in which national security is concerned, the state appears
here to have no substantial reason for not according full safeguards.
The considerations which show that Homer and Dixon are consistent
with Cafeteria Workers demonstrate that Cafeteria Workers, in refusing
to extend any procedural due process safeguards to the relatively minor
individual interest there involved, has not placed undue limitation upon
the protection provided by both fifth and fourteenth amendment due process
to those individual interests which have been more seriously impaired by
government action.
J.R.S.
97 It is not clear whether in making this determination the court was saying that
confrontation and cross-examination were not required by due process under the
Dixon facts or that the specific procedural protection beyond those procedures ex-
pressly enumerated by the court should be determined initially by the state board of
education. The latter construction would not prevent the court from later holding
that the procedures provided were still not consistent with due process.
98 The textual statement assumes that the court's recognition of the state's con-
cern in preventing adverse publicity was based solely on consideration of that publicity
which might result from a disorderly hearing, and not of that publicity which would
result from full disclosure of what the college was doing. A state has no legitimate
interest in repressing this latter type of publicity.
09 Dixon v. Alabama State Bd. of Educ., 294 F.2d 150, 159 (5th Cir. 1961).
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